decenter self, decenter ethics, and decenter society, thus giving rise to conflict,
potential violence, and despair in society. Here Thiselton argues that the
postmodern self, however, stands closer to biblical realism than the illusory
optimism of modernity's self about human nature and society (130).Postmodern
self can find hope, though, only in the context of a biblical theology of promise.
In the context of promise, a new horizon is formed in which the postmodern self,
which has "a constructed identity," can be "reconstituted."
For Thiselton, acting in the present on the basis of that which is yet to come
constitutesa faith that has self-transformingeffects. It transforms the self because
it "reconstitutes self-identity" as no longer the passive victim of forces of the past
which "situatedn it within a network of pregiven roles and performances, but
opens out a new future in which new purpose brings a "point" to its life. "
The self perceives a call and its value as one-who-is-lovedwithin the larger
narrative plot of God's loving purposes for the world, for society, and for the self"
(160). The "image of Christ" assumes a fundamental role in relation to future
promise. To be transformed into "the image of Christnand to become "like him"
constitute the heart of the divine promise which lifts the self out of its predefined
situatedness and beckons from "beyondnto a new future (153).
This creativetransformationcomes through the Holy Spirit, who transposes
self-interestinto love for others and for the Other (154).The personhood of Godas-Trinityprovides the framework for a dialecticof self-identityand relation to the
"other." In spite of the excellent ideas in this section, Thiselton's theological
developmentof promise,Holy Spirit,and the personhood of Trinity proves rather
vague in comparison to the indepth, philosophical discussions of earlier sections.
His lack of specificity here, unfortunately, is in keeping with much of the current
dialogue on either of these issues, and again reflects an existentialism and neoorthodox perspective of Scripture. At the most, in his own terms, he reaches
"toward a theology of promise." This is a significant discussion on the postmodern understanding of self, but the solutions it advances, while in principle
correct, need more biblical structure and concreteness.
Village Seventhday Adventist Church
Berrien Springs, MI 49103
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Torrance, Thomas F. The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being, %ee Persons.
Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996. 272 pp. $49.95.
As an example of doctrine-as-explanation (in contrast to, say, doctrine-asThomas Torrance's The Christian Doctrine of God, One Being, Three
Pmons is a tour de force. Torrance, who is professor emeritus at the University
of Edinburgh, is concernedthat the Protestant doctrineof God no longer succumb
to the tendency to wrongly conceive God's tri-unityfirst in terms of the divine
essence and only s~bsequentlyin terms of the divine Persons (112).Torrance offers
a two-fold conception of divine Being, as personal and perichoretic, to make this
corrective.
Torrance begins with the insistence that the evangelical,or economic, trinity
is identical with the immanent, or ontological, trinity (133).Thus, following Karl

Barth, the revelation of God in Christ as Revealer, Revelation, and Revealedness
factually indicates the same triadic ratio that characterizes God's intrinsic Being
(32). The difficulty here, of course, is to avoid simply reproducing the tritheism
that seems implicit in all Platonic formulations of the Trinity, in which otrsia
relates to hypostasis as universal to particular. However, Torrance claims to have
unearthed an "onto-personalnconception of Being, which escapestritheism, in the
line of thought that stretches from Athanasius and Cyril of Alexandria to
Epiphanius and Gregory of Nazianzus. While earlier patristic doctrine treated
hypostasis (a relational term) as synonymous with ousia (a static term), subsequent
thinkers beginning with Athanasius conceived the "ontic relationsnbetween the
divine Persons as belonging to what they are as Persons (156-157). Torrance
concludes, "The relations between the divine Persons are not just modes of
existence but hypostatic interrelationswhich belong intrinsicallyto what Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit are coinherentlyin themselves and in their mutual objective
relations with and for one another. These relations subsisting between them are
just as substantial as what they are unchangeably in themselves and by themselvesn
(157).The upshot of this bit of conceptualarcheologylies in Torrance's conclusion
that God's Being is not staticand impersonal (as Greek philosophy demanded) but
penoml: God's Being cannot but be spoken of in the same breath as God's triadic
Personality, and vice versa (128).
Torrance's second corrective to the doctrine of the Trinity is an emphasis on
the soteriological necessity of God's perichoresis. The form of Athanasius's
christological argument (namely, that the efficacy of salvation hangs upon the full
divinity of the Son), applies simultaneously to the Father and the Spirit. Thus,
"unless the Being and Activity of the Spirit are identical with the Being and
Activity of the Father and the Son, we are not savedn (169). The mutual
coinherenceof Father, Son, and Holy Spirit excludesany consideration that "some
attributes and activities common to the whole Trinity may be specially assigned
or 'appropriated' to one Person rather than another in order to reveal his
distinctive hypostatic charactern(200). Rather, each Person of the Godhead is the
onto-relational source (which is not to say the causal or temporal origin) of
qualities that apply uniformly to the whole. For example, the Holy Spirit is the
onto-relationalsource for the "spiritnessnof the Godhead by which God as a whole
imbues creation with life, or spiritual power. God as a whole acts as spirit toward
creation just as God as a whole acts as father toward creation. In this way God's
activity outside the Godhead is not only indivisible (opera trinitatis ad extra sunt
indivisa);it is an important analogy to intra-trinitarianrelations (140,215,218-220,
243).
Torrance provides his theses with strong historical support derived mainly
from a careful exegesis of Athanasius's writings. Torrance's approach is historical
in a second way as well. Like his forebear Barth, Torrance aspires to an
intentionally "circular" methodologicalholism (3, or "depth exegesisn(37-5O),that
aims to avoid grounding theology on any nontheological source. In his eyes,
revelation provides its own frame of reference for intelligibility(43). That is to say,
there is no basis for knowledge of God prior to that knowledge of God. This
implies, first, that one's character must be adequated by God's Spirit to the task

of theology (11,34,61-62,83,88,99-100,106,127).
Only such a person can attain
to the "mystery of godliness," which Torrance identifies as the ability to think in
a trinitarian way (74). But, second, this means that just as God cannot be analyzed
into parts (simplicitasDez), so too knowledge of God is of a piece; each Person of
the Godhead, being internally related to the others, can be known only to the
extent one understands the other two, and thus to the extent one understands the
whole (174). In this sense the Trinity can be likened to the three-dimensional
image which emerges from a stereoscope: only by simultaneous focus on each of
the similar, but necessarily dzferent, pictures can the accurate image of the whole
be perceived (47).
The difficult task of mastering this difficult book is made more onerous by
the persistence of a number of problems throughout. For example, after
establishingthat intra-trinitarianrelations belong to the nature of each Person and
thus to the Being of the whole Godhead (surely a form of idealism), it becomes
very difficult to imagine on what grounds Torrance can assert that the relations
of God ad extra do not belong to God's nature. In other words, how can it be that
Pentecost manifested a change in God's relations with creation, but not a change
in God's "nature" (238)?This inconsistency renders ambiguous the cash value of
his notion of "onto-personal" Being.
However, a more glaring difficulty, it seems to me, is the lack of nuance in
Torrance's theological use of language. First, Torrance claims that "theological
concepts are used aright when we do not think the concepts themselves, thereby
identifying them with the truth, but think through them of the realities or truths
which they are meant to intend beyond themselves" (194). But how can we ever
be certain we are getting things right?On the presupposition that the Holy Spirit
compels an adequate transformation of an individual's consciousness (34, 61-62)?
Perhaps. On the grounds that there must be an amlogia relationis between God's
dealings with creation and his intra-trinitarian relations (243)?Maybe. But these
ways of putting the matter turn the clock backwards to the early twentieth
century, when conservatives debated liberals over the mechanism of theological
language;a debate, incidentally, that was never satisfactorily settled in these terms
and, moreover, that re dated Barth's own thoughts on the matter.
Second, and even more troubling to this reviewer, is Torrance's inattention
to the irreducibly social character of theological language and belief. Nowhere
does Torrance discuss the role that participation in the believing community's
corporate life plays in understanding claims about God. So Torrance cites the
apostle Thomas's ascription of lordship to Jesus as if that were intelligible apart
from the political context in which it was written. But early readers of John's
Gospel would not naturally hear "my Lord and my God" as an ontological claim
about the identity of Jesus Christ with Yahweh (51-53). Rather, they would
recognize in these words the very DominusetDarsnoster that Domitian demanded
be rendered unto him! Thus Thomas's claim is none other than a declaration of
allegiance to a new, and in Rome's eyes subversive, polis called the church.
Similarly, it may have been more fruitful for Torrance to considerperichoresis as
agrammaticalremark that gets its sense from the social solidaritythat constitutes
the Body of Christ than as a meta-scientific term that purportedly explains God's

intrinsicallytrinitarian nature (88-111).Sadly, Torrance appears unable to suggest
any way in which the church is the foundation of doctrinaltruth (1 Tim. 3: 15), not
the other way around.
Torrance may very well be correct that contemporary Western theology
lacks the conceptual resources for correctly conceiving God. But it is not clear that
such resources can be supplied by a meticulous explanation of ancient vocabulary
that does not attend to the communal form of life which gave this vocabulary its
original sense. In the end, Torrance may simply have invented a new language
(using old words), the language of onto-penonality and perichoresis, which is
grounded in contemporary scientific culture rather than in the praxis of firstcentury faith. The question remains, therefore, whether fluency in this language
ought to be referred over the biblical declaration, "My Lord and my God."
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